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Objective:  To  describe  the  relationship  between  industry  and  physicians  and  to analyze  the  physician
characteristics  associated  with  the  probability  of  receiving  beneﬁts  from  industry  in  Aragon  (Spain).
Methods:  We  carried  out  an observational,  cross-sectional  study  in which  Aragonese  physicians  (north-
east region  in  Spain)  from  public  and  private  settings  completed  an  anonymous  questionnaire  on  a  web
page between  June  and  November  2008.  Visits/month  with  industry,  samples,  gifts,  reimbursements  and
payments  were  used  as dependant  variables  in  the  regression  analyses.  Year  of medical  license,  specialty,
work  setting,  time  spent  on  direct  care,  articles  read/month  and  being  a resident’s  tutor  were  used  as
independent  variables.
Results: A total  of 659  questionnaires  were  considered  valid  for  the  analysis.  Overall,  87% (n = 573)  of  the
respondents  reported  they  had  received  some  beneﬁt  in  the  previous  year  and 90.1%  (n = 593) reported
having  held  meetings  with  industry  representatives  monthly.  Non-clinical  specialists  received  fewer  gifts
(odds ratio  [OR]  =  0.38;  95%  conﬁdence  interval  [95%CI]:  0.18-0.77),  reimbursements  (OR = 0.14;  95%CI:
0.06-0.35)  and  payments  (OR =  0.30;  95%CI:  0.13-0.74)  than  their  clinical  colleagues.  The  probability  of
receiving  reimbursements  (OR  =  0.37;  95%CI:  0.15-0.89)  and  payments  (OR  =  0.39;  95%CI:  0.20-0.77)  was
lower in  primary  care  physicians.
Conclusions:  This  study,  performed  in a sample  of physicians  from  a southern  European  region,  demon-
strates  differences  in the  intensity  of  the  physician-industry  relationship  depending  on  physician
specialty  and  work  setting.  These  results  provide  important  information  for  improving  transparency
and  for  future  research  on  the  appropriateness  and  efﬁciency  of  prescription  in  Spain  and  other  countries
with  similar  health  systems.
© 2011  SESPAS.  Published  by Elsevier  España,  S.L.  All  rights  reserved.
Relación  entre  los  médicos  y  la  industria  en  Aragón  (Espan˜a)
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Objetivo:  Describir,  en Aragón,  la  relación  entre  los  médicos  y  la  industria,  y  analizar  las  características
de  los  médicos  que  se  asocian  con  la  probabilidad  de  recibir  beneﬁcios.
Métodos:  Estudio  transversal  en el cual  médicos  aragoneses  del  sector  público  y  privado  rellenaron  un
cuestionario  anónimo  en  una  página  web,  entre  junio  y noviembre  de  2008.  El  número  de  visitas/mes  con
la industria,  muestras,  regalos,  dietas  y pagos  se  incluyeron  como  variables  dependientes  en  los  modelos
de regresión.  Las  variables  an˜o  de  licenciatura,  especialidad,  lugar  de  trabajo,  tiempo  de  atención,  artículos
leídos/mes  y  ser  tutor  de  residentes  se utilizaron  como  variables  independientes.
Resultados:  Se consideraron  válidos  659  cuestionarios  completados.  En  general,  el 87%  de  los  que
respondieron  contestaron  que habían  recibido  algún  beneﬁcio  en  el  último  an˜o,  y un  90,1%  (n =  593)
respondieron  que  habían  tenido  alguna  entrevista  con  representantes  de  la industria  mensualmente.  Las
especialidades  no  clínicas  recibieron  menos  regalos  (odds  ratio  [OR]  =  0,38;  intervalo  de  conﬁanza  del
95%  [IC95%]:  0,18-0,77),  dietas  (OR  =  0,14;  IC95%:  0,06-0,35)  y  pagos  (OR  = 0,30;  IC95%:  0,13-0,74)  que
sus  colegas  clínicos.  La  probabilidad  de  recibir  dietas  (OR  = 0,37;  IC95%:  0,15-0,89)  y pagos  (OR  =  0,39;
IC95%:  0,20-0,77)  fue menos  probable  para  los  médicos  de  atención  primaria.
Conclusiones:  Este  estudio  muestra  diferencias  en  la intensidad  de  la  relación  médico-industria  en  fun-
ción de  la especialidad  y el lugar  de  trabajo  del médico.  Esta información  se  considera  importante  para
mejorar  la transparencia  y para  desarrollar  investigaciones  futuras  sobre  la  adecuación  y la eﬁciencia  de
o  país
011  Sla  prescripción  en nuestr
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IntroductionThe drug sector represents 1.5% of the gross domestic product
in Spain and directly employs approximately 40,000 people.1 Many
studies report an increase of drug use and prescription in Spain,
ts reserved.
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ven though institutional surveys have shown little variation in
se after security/safety alerts.2
Claims about drug use and its impact on the economy are com-
on in the public agendas of developed countries. Populations are
ging, and there is a clear increase in drug use in parallel with the
ge-related burden of disease.3 The medicalization of life is leading
o increased spending on drugs and is endangering patients, as the
isk-beneﬁt ratio does not always justify the treatment, which is
ften unwarranted, ineffective and inefﬁcient.4
Drug companies are one of the main sources of information for
hysicians, and evidence suggests that important bias and prob-
ems of veracity, as well as of accuracy, exist in the information
hey transmit.5,6
Several authors have discussed the inﬂuence of promotion on
hysicians’ prescription practices, referring to doctors’ underes-
imation of the power of this relationship on their decisions.7,8
ecently, the potential inﬂuence of industry activity has come
nder scrutiny, even reaching decision making institutions such
s the World Health Organization whose management of the H1N1
pidemic may  have been unduly inﬂuenced by the drug industry.9
Several authors have reported physician-industry relationships,
uch as Campbell et al10 in the USA, Saito et al11 in Japan, and
ltisent et al12 in Spain. In addition, some attempts to ﬁght the
nlimited growth of drug consumption and expenditure, as well
s to avoid “corruption” by pharmaceutical companies have been
ade.9,13,14 However, quantifying the industry-physician rela-
ionship remains important, especially in those health systems
redominantly funded by public resources. In Spain, this relation-
hip has only been analyzed in primary care.
This study aims to describe, for the ﬁrst time, the relationship
etween the drug industry and physicians and to analyze the char-
cteristics of physicians associated with the probability of receiving
eneﬁts from this industry in Aragon, a region of Spain. This report
s part of a more general study that analyzed physicians’ opinions
nd attitudes to industry representatives’ knowledge of their pre-
cribing patterns.15
ethods
We  performed an observational cross-sectional study in which
octors registered in the Aragon Health System, both in public and
rivate practice, were invited to participate by e-mail or post.16
he study population consisted of 5,038 physicians registered in
ragon, a north-east Spanish region, at the beginning of 2008, and
ho had publicly accessible contact details. Electronic addresses
ere found for 3,439 participants while the remaining 1,599 were
ent a letter by post. The study’s protocol was  approved by the
thics and Clinical Investigation Committee of Aragon.
Physicians who agreed to participate ﬁlled in an anonymous,
d-hoc questionnaire available on a web page between June and
ovember 2008. A second e-mail was sent as a reminder 2 months
fter the ﬁrst invitation. Questionnaires were considered valid
hen at least 80% of the items were answered. As an incentive to
articipate, a prize was drawn for a laptop computer.
To ensure the reliability of the answers, each physician was
ersonally invited to participate and, to avoid more than one ques-
ionnaire being completed by the same person, the prize was  drawn
nly for those giving personal data.
easurement toolA Spanish questionnaire was created based on Campbell’s ques-
ionnaire referring to American physicians’ opinions and attitudes
bout the medical profession.10 After the validity study, the ques-
ionnaire was modiﬁed accordingly.16 The questionnaire consisted012;26(4):336–342 337
of four sections: a) professional history, b) professional attitudes,
c) professional activities and behavior, and d) personal and profes-
sional characteristics. Only the analyses of sections a, c and d are
shown.
Study outcomes
To elicit information on beneﬁts, we asked “Have you ever
received any of the following in the last year from drug, device
or other medically related companies?”. The answer comprised 12
options, each with a yes/no response. Afterwards, four post-hoc cat-
egories of physician–industry relationships were created. The ﬁrst
category was free drug samples. The second category was gifts,
which included restaurant invitations, free tickets to cultural or
sporting events, and gifts given because of prescribing practices
and non-medical learning activities. The third category was reim-
bursements for expenses, including the costs of travel, time, meals,
lodging, or other personal expenses for attending meetings and free
or subsidized admission to meetings, books or other material for
continuing education. The fourth category consisted of payments
for consulting, serving on a scientiﬁc advisory board or board of
directors, speaking at a professional meeting, or enrolling patients
in industry-sponsored studies.
To obtain information on the frequency of physician-industry
meetings, the following question was used: “In an average month,
how many times do you meet with representatives from drug,
device, or other medically related companies?”.
All four beneﬁts (samples, gifts, reimbursements and payments,
as well as the frequency of meetings) were used as dependent vari-
ables for the analyses.
Study variables
Medical specialty and work setting were considered the most
important physician characteristics and were included as indepen-
dent variables for the analyses. Medical specialities were pooled
into four categories: hospital medical specialities, surgical spe-
cialities (including anesthesiology, gynecology, ophthalmology,
otorhinolaryngology, urology and orthopedics), general and pri-
mary care, and non-clinical specialities (preventive medicine, and
other disciplines including specialty laboratories). Work setting
was pooled into three categories: hospital, primary care and other
settings (i.e. university, public health, administration).
The following items coded as categorical variables were selected
on the basis of the available evidence suggesting their possible role
in the physician-industry relationship and were used as confound-
ing factors: age, sex, year of medical license, time spent in the direct
provision of care, scientiﬁc articles read per month, tutoring a resi-
dent physician in the last 3 years, opinion on the physician-industry
relationship elicited through the question “What is your opinion
about the fact that industry representatives have access to data on
the quantity and kinds of drug you prescribe?”.
Statistical analyses
To study the association of the beneﬁts received from industry
with physician proﬁle/characteristics, the Chi-square test for cat-
egorical data and Student’s t-tests for continuous variables were
performed. To further study these associations, logistic regression
models were applied, using each of the four beneﬁts as depen-
dant variables. In all models, both specialty and work setting were
included as independent variables, controlling for the potential
confounders listed above.
A negative binomial regression model was used to evaluate the
association between the frequency of industry representative visits
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Table 1
Characteristics of physician respondents to the questionnaire, Aragon (Spain), 2008
Female sex, n (%) 333 (50.7)
Age
<40 years, n (%) 168 (25.5)
41-50 years, n (%) 257 (39.0)
>50 years, n (%) 234 (35.5)
Year of medical license
≤1969, n (%) 12 (1.8)
1970-1979, n (%) 174 (26.6)
1980-1989,n (%) 261 (39.8)
1990-1999, n (%) 172 (26.3)
≥2000, n (%) 36 (5.5)
Specialty
General and primary care, n (%) 271 (43.6)
Surgery, n (%) 81 (13.0)
Non-clinical, n (%) 95 (15.3)
Hospital medical, n (%) 175 (28.1)
Work setting
Private medicine, n (%) 20 (3.0)
Primary care rural center, n (%) 142 (21.5)
Primary care urban center, n (%) 153 (23.2)
Hospital < 500 beds, n (%) 130 (19.7)
Hospital > 500 beds, n (%) 156 (23.7)
Outpatient consultation ofﬁce, n (%) 23 (3.5)
Other, n (%) 35 (5.3)
Time spent on direct provision of care (week)
0 h, n (%) 38 (5.8)
1-19 h, n (%) 95 (14.4)
20-39 h, n (%) 373 (56.6)
≥40 h, n (%) 153 (23.2)
Visits per month, mean (95%CI) 15.66 (14.29-17.03)
Beneﬁts received by physicians
Samples, n (%) 319 (48.4)
Gifts, n (%) 337 (51.6)
Reimbursements, n (%) 530 (80.9)
(
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sPayments, n (%) 181 (27.6)
meetings) with physician specialty and work setting, adjusted for
he same covariates.
Odds ratios (OR) with 95% conﬁdence intervals (95%IC)
ere calculated and the chosen overall signiﬁcance level was
.05 (alpha).
esults
Six hundred and ﬁfty nine questionnaires were considered valid
or analysis (13.1%), when at least 80% of the questions were
nswered and less than 1% was discarded. The characteristics of
he respondents are shown in Table 1.
Globally, 87% (n = 573) reported having received some kind of
eneﬁt from industry during the previous year, and 90.1% (n = 593)
eported having had some meeting with industry representatives
onthly. When asked about their opinion of industry representa-
ives having access to personal data on the quantity and kinds of
rug prescribed, 58.6% of physicians reported a negative response
nd 35.6% were indifferent.
Our results indicate that the physician proﬁle which most likely
eceives industry beneﬁts corresponds to a young man, with a med-
cal specialty, working in a hospital, spending 20-39 hours/week
n direct provision of care, who reads fewer than 10 articles per
onth and who has been a resident’s tutor in the last 3 years
Table 2).
Table 3 shows the probability of receiving each beneﬁt according
o physician characteristics. Overall, hospital medical specialities
ere more likely to receive beneﬁts from industry. Non-clinical
pecialists received fewer gifts (OR = 0.38; 95%CI: 0.18-0.77),012;26(4):336–342
reimbursements (OR = 0.14; 95%CI: 0.06-0.35) and payments
(OR = 0.30; 95%CI: 0.13-0.74) than their clinical colleagues. To elim-
inate an erroneous interpretation, a secondary analysis was re-run
without the non-clinical specialty, and no substantial modiﬁcations
in the results were observed.
Samples were three times more likely to be given in pri-
mary care settings than in the hospital setting (OR = 3.67; 95%CI:
1.91-7.06). The probability of receiving gifts was directly asso-
ciated with the number of meetings between physicians and
industry (OR = 1.05; 95%CI: 1.03-1.07) and was  inversely asso-
ciated with the number of articles read per month (OR = 0.43;
95%CI: 0.25-0.72). Both reimbursements and payments were asso-
ciated with the number of meetings between physicians and
industry (OR = 1.05; 95%CI: 1.02-1.07; OR = 1.03; 95%CI: 1.02-1.04);
and in both, compared with hospitals, primary care settings
were less likely to receive these beneﬁts (OR = 0.37; 95%CI:
0.15-0.89; OR = 0.39; 95%CI: 0.20-0.77).
The mean number of representative visits showed statistically
signiﬁcant differences between physicians who  reported receiving
samples and those who  reported not receiving samples (20.6 vs
10.94; p = 0.000), gifts (20.96 vs 9.90; p = 0.000), reimbursements
(17.43 vs 8.33; p = 0.000) and payments (23.25 vs 12.79; p = 0.000).
Compared with medical hospital specialities, non-clinical special-
ists met  signiﬁcantly less frequently with industry representatives
(Table 4).
Discussion
This study shows that relationships between industry and
physicians do exist and that they are related to specialty and work
setting.
Our ﬁndings agree with those of previous studies.8,10,11,17 We
replicate the ﬁndings of a previous study reporting that pay-
ments for services were more frequent for men  than for women
and explain this in terms of the possible effects of physician
gender on medical practice.18 Our data also support the idea
that the more years of practice, the fewer gifts the physician
receives, previously documented in the American and Japanese
studies.10,11
The inﬂuence of specialty has previously been reported by
Campbell et al.10 We  observed a tendency of surgical and med-
ical hospital specialities to have more representative visits and
to more frequently receive beneﬁts from industry than primary
care and non-clinical. The comparison might be limited because
the sample analyzed in the present study included non-clinical
specialists; however, the secondary analyses without that cat-
egory contradicts this argument. Therefore, we may conclude
that medical specialty is an indicator of the relationship and
we provide suggestions for probable context differences among
countries.
As found by previous studies,10,17 we  found differences between
hospital and primary care but the implications differ since Span-
ish medical care is mainly public and few physicians develop their
practice exclusively in private services, as might be the case in the
USA. In Spain, primary care physicians were more likely to receive
samples but were less likely to be given reimbursements and pay-
ments than professionals in hospitals. This ﬁnding might be due to
the speciﬁc Spanish context. Physicians working in hospitals prob-
ably attract industry more, as private medical settings often have
hospital medical or surgical specialists who work partly in the pub-
lic sector but very rarely professionals working in public primary
care. The peculiarities of the Japanese health system hamper the
comparison as primary care does not exist in that country. Saito et
al11 used the workplace variable, hospital versus ofﬁce, and found
no signiﬁcant associations.
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Table 2
Physician characteristics according to the beneﬁt received, Aragon (Spain), 2008
Samples Gifts Reimbursements Payments
% p OR 95%CI % p OR 95%CI % p OR 95%CI % p OR 95%CI
Gender
Men 48.5 0.99 0.69-1.45 55.3 1.09 0.75-1.57 82.0 1.03 0.64-1.63 36.2 b 1.86 1.22-2.81
Women 48.0 1 - 48.3 1 - 79.7 1 - 19.0 1 -
Age
<40  years 56.0 - 53.0 - 83.8 - 23.2 -
41-50 years 45.9 51.2 79.9 26.6
>  50 years 45.9 51.1 79.9 31.9
Year  of medical license
≤1979 44.6
a
1 - 53.3 1 - 81.7 1 - 33.5 1 -
1980-1989 44.4 0.95 0.61-1.49 50.2 1.04 0.66-1.62 78.7 1.08 0.61-1.91 26.6 0.88 0.54-1.43
≥1990  56.3 2.08 1.25-3.46 52.4 1.17 0.71-1.91 82.6 1.32 0.68-2.55 23.1 0.91 0.52-1.57
Specialty
General and primary care 55.7
b
0.41 0.22-0.77 53.8
b
0.75 0.42-1.34 78.1
b
0.4 0.17-0.92 21.5
b
0.6 0.32-1.11
Surgery 50.6 1.29 0.72-2.33 61.7 1.33 0.73-2.42 90.1 0.75 0.27-2.06 33.3 0.6 0.32-1.12
Non-clinical 18.9 0.68 0.32-1.46 27.4 0.38 0.18-0.77 60.2 0.14 0.06-0.35 12.8 0.31 0.13-0.74
Hospital medical 554 1 - 59.4 1 - 93.1 1 - 42.3 1 -
Work  setting
Other 29.5
b
0.95 0.50-1.81 32.5
b
0.63 0.34-1.16 57.3
b
0.26 0.13-0.54 18.2
b
0.58 0.27-1.23
Primary care center 62.0 3.67 1.91-7.06 55.2 0.77 0.42-1.41 80.3 0.37 0.15-0.89 23.5 0.4 0.20-0.77
Hospital 39.5 1 - 53.1 1 - 87.7 1 - 34.3 1 -
Time  spent on direct provision of care/week
0 h 5.3
b
1 - 23.7
b
1 - 51.4
b
1 - 10.8
b
1 -
1-19  h 27.4 43.2 74.7 20.0
20-39  h 58.4 2.76 1.51-5.02 57.6 0.86 0.49-1.51 84.1 0.9 0.46-1.76 32.9 1.29 0.64-2.59
≥40  h 47.7 2.10 1.09-4.06 49.3 0.71 0.38-1.33 84.1 1.03 0.48-2.22 23.5 0.79 0.36-1.74
Articles  read per month
0-4 50.8 1 - 59.2 1 - 75.0 1 - 23.3
a
1 -
5-9  53.4 1.09 0.65-1.85 53.2 0.6 0.36-1.01 83.2 1.46 0.77-2.79 23.3 1.07 0.58-1.96
≥10  43.6 0.71 0.42-1.18 47.3 0.43 0.25-0.72 81.5 1.12 0.59-2.10 32.6 1.46 0.82-2.61
Being  a resident’s tutor in the last 3 years
Yes 52.9 1.25 0.84-1.88 58.3 a 1.16 0.78-1.73 84.7 1.25 0.73-2.14 41.3 b 1.88 1.24-2.84
No  46.1 1 - 48.1 1 - 78.9 1 - 20.6 1 .
What  is your opinion about the fact that industry representatives have access to data on the quantity and kind of drug you prescribe?
Positive 54.1 1 - 45.9 1 - 89.2 1 - 27.0 1 -
Negative 51.8 0.87 0.40-1.89 52.1 1.27 0.59-2.70 80.2 0.46 0.13-1.64 30.7 0.94 0.39-2.23
Indifferent 43.7 0.75 0.34-1.67 52.9 1.59 0.73-3.44 80.7 0.49 0.13-1.78 23.9 0.73 0.30-1.79
OR: odds ratio; 95%CI: 95% conﬁdence interval.
a Statistical signiﬁcance was  set at p <0.05.
b Statistical signiﬁcance was  set at p <0.001.
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Table 3
Type of beneﬁt according to physician characteristics, Aragon (Spain), 2008 (logistic regression model)
Samplesa Giftsa Reimbursementsa Paymentsa
ORa 95%CI ORa 95%CI ORa 95%CI ORa 95%CI
Gender
Women 1 - 1 - 1 -  1 -
Men  0.99 0.69-1.45 1.09 0.75-1.57 1.02 0.64-1.63 1.86 1.22-2.81
Year  of medical license
≤1979 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1980-1989 0.95 0.61-1.49 1.04 0.66-1.62 1.08 0.61-1.91 0.88 0.54-1.43
≥1990 2.08 1.25-3.46 1.17 0.71-1.91 1.32 0.68-2.55 0.91 0.52-1.57
Specialty
Hospital medical 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
General & primary care 0.41 0.22-0.77 0.75 0.42-1.34 0.39 0.17-0.92 0.60 0.32-1.11
Surgery 1.29 0.72-2.33 1.33 0.73-2.42 0.75 0.27-2.06 0.59 0.32-1.12
Non-clinical 0.68 0.32-1.46 0.38 0.18-0.77 0.14 0.06-0.35 0.30 0.13-0.74
Work setting
Hospital 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
Primary care 3.67 1.91-7.06 0.77 0.42-1.41 0.37 0.15-0.89 0.39 0.20-0.77
Other 0.95 0.50-1.81 0.63 0.34-1.16 0.26 0.13-0.54 0.57 0.27-1.23
Time  spent on direct provision of care/week
0-19 h 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
20-39 h 2.76 1.51-5.02 0.86 0.49-1.51 0.89 0.46-1.76 1.29 0.64-2.59
≥40  h 2.10 1.09-4.06 0.71 0.38-1.33 1.03 0.48-2.22 0.79 0.36-1.74
Articles read per month
0-4 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
5-9 1.09  0.65-1.85 0.59 0.36-1.01 1.46 0.77-2.79 1.07 0.58-1.96
≥10  0.71 0.42-1.18 0.43 0.25-0.72 1.12 0.59-2.10 1.46 0.82-2.61
Being  a resident’s tutor in the last 3 years
No 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
Yes  1.25 0.84-1.88 1.16 0.78-1.73 1.25 0.73-2.14 1.88 1.24-2.84
What  is your opinion of the fact that industry representatives have access to data on the quantity and kinds of drug you prescribe?
Favorable 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
Unfavorable 0.87 0.40-1.89 1.27 0.59-2.70 0.46 0.13-1.64 0.94 0.39-2.23
Unimportant 0.75 0.34-1.67 1.59 0.73-3.44 0.49 0.13-1.78 0.73 0.30-1.79
Monthly meetings with representatives from drug, device, or other medically-related companies
1.03 1.01-1.04 1.05 1.03-1.07 1.05 1.02-1.07 1.03 1.02-1.04
ORa: adjusted odds ratio; 95%CI: 95% conﬁdence interval.
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The assumption that the more a physician prescribes, the greater
he probability of a relationship with the pharmaceutical industry
ay  help to explain why, in our data, non-clinical specialists were
ess likely to receive gifts, payments or expenses from industry.19
n this sense, “big ticket” prescribers are probably more likely to
eneﬁt from industry perks and, therefore, present clear conﬂicts
f interest.20
The variable of time spent on direct care determined only the
robability of receiving samples while no statistically signiﬁcant
ifferences were found in relation to other kinds of beneﬁt. In addi-
ion, primary care physicians in Spain do not spend less time on
irect care and/or prescribe less than medical hospital specialists.
ime spent on direct care, as well as other explanations found in
he literature such as the patients’ age, would fail to explain our
nding that medical hospital specialists received more beneﬁts.21
 better explanation could be that hospital medical-surgical spe-
ialists in Spain frequently work in both the public and private
ettings.
The inclusion of all kinds of specialists and all kinds of work
ettings is original and adds strength to our ﬁndings, since it
llows us to observe that the inﬂuence of industry is not limited
o prescribers. We  found that at least 5.7% of the physicians
eveloped some activity not directly related to the provision
f care; 87% of the sample reported having received some ben-
ﬁt from industry in the last year and 90.1% reported havingnd confounding variables listed in the left column.
met  with representatives various times monthly. The implica-
tions of this ﬁnding should be highlighted since, reinforcing
previous results,19,22,23 education, management, decision mak-
ing and research might be inﬂuenced by the pharmaceutical
industry.
The number of articles read per month could be an important
indicator of physicians’ attitude and professionalism. The inverse
association with the probability of receiving gifts observed in the
present study might correspond to a more evidence-based clinical
practice.
The present study has some limitations. The literature sug-
gests the effects of “social desirability” in surveys such as ours.
However, this study consisted of an anonymous questionnaire
and we believe this bias was minimized when questions were
asked on practice behavior and opinions. Although the response
rate of less than 60% limits the study’s validity, low response rates
were also obtained in other studies in the literature on the same
subject.11 The low response rate and participants’ anonymity
hampers generalization of the results.
An important consideration relates to the fourth category of
beneﬁts. Although beneﬁts can determine drug prescription, pay-
ments might be assumed to be a different relationship between
physicians with industry and to have a closer connection with sci-
entiﬁc considerations. Future research might include beneﬁts as a
speciﬁc outcome variable.
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Table  4
Number of visits from representatives per month, according to physician character-
istics, in Aragon (Spain), 2008 (negative binomial regression model).
OR 95%CI ORa 95%CI
Gender
Female 1 -
Male 1.02 0.86-1.20 1.00 0.83-1.21
Year of medical license
≤1979 1.19 0.96-1.49 1.23 0.95-1.58
1980-1989 1.12 0.92-1.37 1.05 0.84-1.31
≥1990 1 -
Specialty
Hospital medical 1 - 1 -
General and primary care 1.00 0.81-1.23 0.94 0.71-1.24
Surgery 0.79 0.60-1.06 0.87 0.64-1.17
Non-clinical 0.36 0.27-0.48 0.50 0.36-0.70
Work setting
Hospital 1 - 1 -
Other 0.60 0.46-0.79 0.67 0.49-0.89
Primary care 1.36 1.14-1.62 1.16 0.87-1.55
Time spent on direct provision of care/week
0-19h 0.56 0.44-0.72 0.75 0.55-1.02
20-39h 1.21 0.99-1.48 1.13 0.91-1.42
≥40h 1 . 1 -
Articles read per month
0-4 0.81 0.64-1.02 0.87 0.67-1.12
5-9  0.95 0.79-1-14 1.03 0.84-1.26
≥10 1 . 1 -
Being a resident’s tutor in the last 3 years
No 1 . 1 -
Yes 1.26 1.06-1.51 1.15 0.94-1.39
OR: odds ratio; ORa: adjusted odds ratio; 95%CI: 95% conﬁdence interval.
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sImportantly, although physicians answered questions related
ot only to drug companies but also to other medically related com-
anies, we have presumed that relationships with industry were
ostly focused on drugs and thus our interpretations of results
efer to pharmaceutical corporations.
More detailed information on working hours, patient char-
cteristics, prescribing behavior and volume should be included
n future research, and the policies of hospitals and clinics on
hysician-industry relationships should be analyzed in our setting,
s has been studied elsewhere.24,25
The data presented herein are innovative and useful for deci-
ion making in our region and, perhaps, in other regions and
ountries with similar health systems. Our results are coherent
ith previous ﬁndings; the role of industry and the response
f the medical profession seem to be similar in our region and
n the USA. However, the implications differ, given the spe-
iﬁc characteristics of the two health systems. In Spain, drug
osts are shouldered mostly by the public healthcare system,
hich means that government authorities should make greater
fforts to control drug expenditure through medical educa-
ion or management policies. Recent health reforms in Spain
ave focused on drugs and new activities such as provid-
ng physicians with advice on the rational use of drugs and
tudying prescription habits, which may  pose organizational
hallenges.26 The data presented herein support the idea of
ncluding the study of drug-industry relationships. The differ-
nt intensity found in physician-industry relationships depending
n the physician’s specialty and work setting provides impor-
ant information for future research on the appropriateness and
fﬁciency of prescription and for improving the transparency of
he physician-industry relationship, especially in public healthcare
ystems.27,28012;26(4):336–342 341
What is known on the topic?
Evidence suggests that drug industry promotion inﬂuences
physician prescribing in countries such as the USA. It is impor-
tant to quantify industry-physician relationships in the Spanish
health system, predominantly funded by public resources, and
to analyze the characteristics of physicians associated with
a higher probability of receiving beneﬁts from industry in a
southern European country.
What does this study add to the literature?
This study demonstrates, for the ﬁrst time, the extent of
the relationship between industry and physicians in distinct
specialties, in a southern European country and describes the
characteristics of those more likely to receive beneﬁts from
industry. The results obtained could be useful for policy and
healthcare decision makers, especially those in public health-
care systems, and highlight the need for future research on the
appropriateness and efﬁciency of prescription.
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